Abstract. We present a coalgebraic semantics for reasoning about information update in multi-agent systems. The novelty is that we have one structure for both states and actions and thus our models do not involve the change-of-model phenomena that arise in the usual Kripke models. However,we prove that the usual models can be constructed from ours by categorical adjunction. The generality and abstraction of our coalgebraic model turns out to be extremely useful in proving preservation properties of update. In particular, we prove that positive knowledge is preserved and acquired as a result of epistemic update. We also prove common and nested knowledge properties of epistemic updates induced by specific epistemic actions such as public and private announcements, lying, and in particular unsafe actions of security protocols. We apply our model to the honest and cheating versions of the muddy children puzzle, for which new coalgebraic proofs are provided. Our model directly gives rise to coalgebraic logics with both dynamic and epistemic modalities. We prove a soundness and completeness result for this logic, and illustrate the applicability of the logic by deriving knowledge properties of a simple security protocol.
Introduction
One of the active fields of research in epistemic logic is modelling interactive multi-agent systems where agents communicate and as a result their knowledge gets updated. This research line has led to the development of dynamic and temporal epistemic logics [13, 7, 14, 20, 5, 3, 12, 11] and their applications in reasoning about multi-agent protocols of Artificial Intelligence, Security and E-commerce. Another active field of research in logic in Computer Science is coalgebraic models for the study of automata and dynamic systems [19, 15, 8] ; Kripke structure models of epistemic logic are examples of such systems. These models provide a modular and uniform formalisation of different functionalities of a system, and also of different properties of these functionalities. As a result, adding new features such as probabilistic knowledge or change of knowledge becomes an easy and natural task.
In this paper we develop a coalgebraic semantics for dynamic epistemic systems. This model enables us to reason about the evolution of such systems in a uniform way, by treating both actions and agents as state transformers. So we have only one structure that captures both dynamics and epistemics. This is contrary to the models of e.g. [14, 4, 1] that require subsequent "changes" to the epistemic structure to model the dynamics. By "change" we mean either the update product between an epistemic Kripke structure and an action Kripke structure [4] , or the update functor on the category of epistemic coalgebras [14, 1] . In either case the epistemic structure is taken to be primitive and the dynamics is captured by operations on it. This brings us to the other novelty of our approach: we start our modelling task by fixing the epistemic actions, and then define the epistemic states based on these actions and on the agents participating in them. Again, this is contrary to the model of [4, 5] , which involves first fixing the epistemic states and then defining all the possible epistemic actions on these states.
Our model has all the advantages of the model of [4, 5] , for instance it benefits from a general updating schema, it reflects the epistemic structure for actions, and it introduces an intrinsic epistemo-behavioural notion of equivalence between actions. Moreover, our model does not have the usual weaknesses, for example operations on actions are a natural part of our models, e.g. sequential composition is simply unfolding the coalgebra map twice and does not need to be defined separately. Also, the preservation of bisimilarity by epistemic actions follows as an internal property of our actions, and need not be proven separately. Finally, we study how epistemic actions and their induced updates affect knowledge of agent, by proving results about preservation and acquisition of knowledge in our model. In particular, we show that positive knowledge is both preserved and acquired as a result of any applicable update. We illustrate the applicability of our model to general scenarios involving both positive and negative knowledge, by presenting a new coalgebraic proof of the muddy children puzzle. In this proof, we solve the puzzle in the reverse order, thus providing a new and more effective proof technique, based on restrictive recursion rather than the usual induction.
Although at first sight our approach seems very different from the approach of [4, 5] , the two are strongly connected. In the main theorem of our paper we show how to construct from our model a the model of [1] and vice versa, and prove that this construction is in fact a categorical adjunction 1 . Finally, our model directly gives rise to a coalgebraic logic with both epistemic and dynamic modalities. This, for instance, cannot be done for the models of [14, 1] . We prove a soundness and completeness result for the resulting logic. As an example of application, we derive the authentication properties of a security protocol.
Coalgebraic Semantics for Actions and Agents
Multi-agent systems are usually modelled by relational structures such as Kripke structures. A Kripke structure is a triple (S, R, V ) At consisting of a set of states S, an accessibility relation R on states R ⊆ S × S and a valuation relation V ⊆ S × At between the states and the set of facts At. The accessibility relation tells us how one state is perceived by, or appears to an agent, for example if we have (s, s ), (s, s ) ∈ R, we say that s appears as s or s to an agent. The choice between s and s expresses the non-deterministic appearance of the agent, and his uncertainty about the real state. The valuation relation tells us which facts are satisfied in a state, for example (s, p), (s, q) ∈ V says that s satisfies p and q. The appearance of multiple agents is encoded by considering a family of accessibility relations {R A } A∈Ag , one for each agent A ∈ Ag; the corresponding Kripke structure is denoted as (S, {R A } A∈Ag , V ) At .
The passage from Kripke structures to coalgebras is made by considering functions rather than relations on the set of states. The accessibility relation R is lifted to a function ap : S → P(S) by gathering the multiple outputs of R on each state in one set. For example instead of (s, s ), (s, s ) ∈ R we will have ap(s) = {s , s }. We refer to the set of states S as the carrier of the coalgebra, and to the function ap as the coalgebra map; the pair (S, ap) is called a coalgebra.
More precisely, if P : Set → Set denotes the powerset functor on the category of sets and functions, then a P-coalgebra map ap : S → P(S) maps each state to its appearance. Since the functor P specifies the shape of the coalgebra, we refer to it as a signature functor.
The valuation relation can be encoded in a coalgebra in a similar way: by considering it as a function val : S → P(At). So instead of (s, p), (s, q) ∈ V we have val(s) = {p, q}. We combine the accessibility and valuation functions to obtain a function ap, val : S → P(S) × P(At), yielding a coalgebra (S, ap, val ). Our signature functor now becomes the product of the powerset functor with a constant functor.
We encode the appearance of multiple agents by making our ap map depend on two inputs (a state and an agent): ap : S × Ag → P(S). So ap takes a state s and an agent A and returns agent A's appearance of s, for example ap(s, A) = {s , s }. By using the the equivalent (curried) form ap : S → P(S)
Ag , we can model a multi-agent Kripke structure as an (epistemic) coalgebra (S, ap, val ) where ap : S → P(S) Ag and val : S → P(At)
We aim to make our epistemic coalgebras dynamic by incorporating (the effect of) actions into them. We start by thinking about actions in the same way as about agents, as a set Ac whose elements change the states. The (deterministic) effect of actions in Ac on states in S is modelled by a function up : S → (1+S)
Ac . For example up(s)(a) stands for the effect of action a on the state s, or the update of s by a. If this effect is the unique element * of 1, that is, up(s)(a) = * 2 , we say that action a does not apply to state s; this should be the case, for instance, when a is the announcement of a fact that does not belong to val(s).
In order to incorporate these action maps into our coalgebra maps, we consider the following signature functor T : Set → Set
where, for technical reasons that will soon become clear, the unbounded powerset functor used to model the epistemic structure of states has been replaced by its κ-bounded variant, with κ a regular cardinal. A coalgebra map for the above functor is thus a triple γ = ap, up, val : S → P κ (S)
Ag × (1 + S) Ac × P(At). One unfolding or application of the coalgebra map provides the appearances of states to the agents ap(s)(A), the effects of actions on the states up(s)(a), and the valuations of states val(s). Two successive unfoldings of the coalgebra map provide the appearances to agents about the appearances of states to other agents, and moreover, with the appearances to agents of the effects of actions ap(up(s)(a))(A) whenever the actions can apply, and the effects of actions on the appearances of states to agents {up(s )(a) | s ∈ ap(s)(A)}. Valuations of each of these sets of states are obtained through three successive unfoldings of the coalgebra map. So we can tell how an agent perceives the effect of an action, and how an action affects the appearance of an agent, and the facts satisfied by the resulting states. The repeated unfolding of the coalgebra map reveals the entire epistemic and dynamic behaviour of the system. In particular, (truthful) common knowledge of a fact p among a group β ⊆ Ag in a state s can be defined recursively as follows p ∈ val(s) and ∀A ∈ β, ∀t ∈ ap(s)(A), p is common knowledge among β in state t
The choice of functor T automatically yields notions of T -bisimulation and T -bisimilarity for T -coalgebras (see e.g. [22] ). These can be described as follows: A T -bisimulation between two T -coalgebras (S, γ) and (S , γ ) is a relation R ⊆ S × S such that for all (s, s ) ∈ R, we have
where γ = ap, up, val : S → T (S) and γ = ap , up , val : S → T (S ). The largest T -bisimulation between (S, γ) and (S , γ ) is called T -bisimilarity and is denoted ∼.
Restrictions to the Coalgebras
We are interested in using T -coalgebras to model the effect of communication actions on the information state or knowledge of agents. Examples of such actions are public or secret announcements, and message passing actions in a multiagent system. We want to model the effect of updates with such actions on the appearances of states to the agents and on the valuations of states. In order to limit the behaviour of our systems to the effect of these actions, we require that the coalgebra maps satisfy some additional conditions, detailed in the following. The communication actions that we model are epistemic, that is, they only affect the information states of agents, while leaving the facts of the world unchanged. Our first restriction, called preservation of facts, reflects this point:
It says that, if applicable to a state, an action does not change the valuation of that state. So the valuation of the effect of the action is the same as the valuation of the state before the action. For example, if p ∈ val(s) and up(s)(a) = * , then also p ∈ val(up(s)(a)), and the other way around. We need this restriction to prove the preservation results later in this section. In a more general approach, one can divide the set of actions into two subsets, namely information-changing actions and fact-changing actions, and only require this restriction for actions of the first type.
Our second restriction is on the appearance of an update to each agent involved in the corresponding action. For applicable updates up(s)(a) = * , this will be related to the update of each of the agent's appearances t ∈ ap(s)(A) with a subset of actions Ac a,A ⊆ Ac, of size strictly less than κ 3 , as follows ap(up(s)(a))(A) = up(t)(a ) | t ∈ ap(s)(A), a ∈ Ac a,A , up(t)(a ) = * where the actions Ac a,A depend both on the action a and on agent A's involvement in it, and are intended to capture agent A's appearance of the action a. This relation says that if an action a applies to a state s, then the appearance of its effect to an agent A is the same as the effect of one of the actions in Ac a,A on one of the appearances to A of the original state s. The case when Ac a,A is a singleton {a } corresponds to a deterministic view of A about the real action a (with A thinking that a is happening when in fact a is happening), whereas any non-singleton set Ac a,A captures A's uncertainty about the action taking place. We refer to the collection of all instances of this restriction (one for each action in Ac) as rationality.
The rationality is our most important restriction, so we spend some time explaining the motivation for imposing it. This restriction helps us compute what an agent knows after an action, based on the information in the system before the action has taken place. For example, to determine whether an agent A knows that p holds after an applicable action a, we need to determine if p holds in A's appearance of the update by a, that is, whether p ∈ val(s ) for all s ∈ ap(up(s)(a))(A). By our restriction, this is equivalent to determining whether p ∈ val up(t)(a ) whenever t ∈ ap(s)(A) and a ∈ Ac a,A with up(t)(a ) = * . Here we use our restriction on preservation of facts, which says that p ∈ val up(t)(a ) if and only if p ∈ val(t). Thus, we only need to check the valuations of states in A's appearance of the original state t ∈ ap(s)(A), but not of all such states, only of those where up(t)(a ) = * for some a ∈ Ac a,A . As we will see below, this depends on whether any of the actions in Ac a,A can be applied to t, and is decided based on the valuation of t and on the content of the actions in Ac a,A . In short, in order to determine what agent A knows after an action a, we need to first unfold A's appearance, then its update by all the actions in Ac a,A , and then apply the valuation map to the resulting states. The unfolding is shown below for one branch of the appearance of s to A and one action a ∈ Ac a,A
It should be noted that we do not directly observe the behaviour of the system on the appearance of the update by a, that is, we do not make use of the following unfolding for each branch of the appearance of w to A
The reason for this is that the information provided to us by the assumptions of the scenario we are modelling specifies the appearances of the initial state, that is, the t's, but not the appearances of states after updates, that is, the w's. This will become more clear in the next section, where we model and solve the muddy children puzzle. Our restriction requires that the set of w 's be the same as the set of t 's, so we only need to observe the behaviour of the t 's to know the behaviour of the w 's. The crucial step in the above is to decide what actions Ac a,A to substitute in the restriction. This depends on the type of the action a and on agent A's role in this action. We explain how these actions are determined by specifying them for a variety of epistemic actions a below. But first we need to define the content of an epistemic action, which makes the action (non-)applicable to some states.
The content of an epistemic action, as its name suggests, describes the information that is being transmitted as a result of the action taking place. We use the following syntax to denote specific contents:
with I an arbitrary set. That is, the content of an action can be a fact, the knowledge or belief of some other content by an agent 4 , the true proposition, the negation of a content, or a (potentially infinite) conjunction of contents. In particular, the content can involve nested knowledge, as in A B p. We do not allow contents to refer to (the effect of) actions, as in [q]−; this avoids a circularity between requiring each action to have a content and allowing contents to depend on actions. Contents whose only occurrences of the negation operator immediately precede a fact are called positive contents, other wise, they are referred to as negative contents.
From now on, we assume that each action a ∈ A has a content µ a associated to it. Then, a should be applicable precisely to those states where its content µ a is satisfied. This is encoded as a further restriction on T -coalgebras, referred to as the content restriction:
where the relation |= between states and contents of actions is defined by structural induction on contents:
and the usual clauses for the true proposition, negation and conjunction. Definition 1. An appearance-update coalgebra is a T -coalgebra additionally satisfying the preservation of facts, content, and rationality restrictions. We denote the set of all of these restrictions by R.
Preservation and Acquisition of Knowledge
An important consequence of the restrictions in R is the so-called preservation of positive contents by updates, made formal in the next result. Proposition 1. Let (S, ap, up, val ) be an appearance-update coalgebra. Then for all positive contents µ, all states s ∈ S, and all actions a ∈ Ac such that up(s)(a) = * , we have
Proof. The statement is proved by induction on µ. If µ is a fact or the negation of a fact, the conclusion follows directly from the preservation of facts. Now suppose that s |= µ implies up(s)(a) |= µ for all states s ∈ S and applicable actions a ∈ Ac. Also, let s ∈ S and A ∈ Ag be such that s |= A µ . To show that up(s)(a) |= A µ for any applicable action a, we use the rationality restriction to reduce ap(up(s)(a))(A) to {up(t)(a ) | t ∈ ap(s)(A), a ∈ Ac a,A , up(t)(a ) = * }. Thus, we must show that up(t)(a ) |= µ whenever t ∈ ap(s)(A) and a ∈ Ac a,A such that up(t)(a ) = * . But this follows from the induction hypothesis and the assumption that s |= A µ . The cases when µ is the true proposition or a conjunction of contents are trivial.
Remark 1. The above result does not hold for negative contents. That is, there exists an appearance-update coalgebra (S, ap, up, val ) and a negative content µ such that for a states s ∈ S with an applicable action a ∈ Ac we have s |= µ but up(s)(a) |= ¬µ.
As an example consider the coalgebra (S, ap, up, val ) given by S = {s, t, s } on the set of atoms At = {p, q}, a singleton set of agents Ag = {A}, and a singleton set of actions Ac = {a} where µ a = ¬ A p and Ac a,A = {a}. The appearance, update, and valuation maps of this coalgebra are given as follows
These assumptions satisfy our restrictions and thus this coalgebra is an appearanceupdate coalgebra. Our only applicable update preserves the facts, that is val(s) = val(s ) = {p}. Rationality also holds for this update, since we have ap(up(s)(a))(A) = ap(s )(A) = {s }, which is equal to {up(s)(a) | s ∈ ap(s)(A), up(s)(a) = * } = {s }. The content is checked by observing that for each element x ∈ S we have two cases up(x)(a) = * and s |= ¬µ a up(x)(a) = * and s |= µ a
The first case is satisfied by t and s , since for both of them all the elements of the image of their appearance maps, that is s and s respectively, satisfy p. The second case is satisfied by s, since there is an element in the image of its appearance, that is t that does not satisfy p. It is easy to see that s |= ¬ A p but up(s)(a) |= A p.
Remark 2. It is also not possible to generalize the above result to an exclusive one only for positive contents. That is, there exists a negative content µ and an appearance-update coalgebra with a state s ∈ S and an applicable action a ∈ Ac, such that s |= µ =⇒ up(s)(a) |= µ. As an example, consider the appearanceupdate coalgebra of remark (1) with val(s) = {p, q} and µ a = q. In this case, it easily follows that both s and s satisfy ¬ A p. Also, any appearance-update coalgebra that owns in its set of actions a neutral action τ with µ τ = tt and Ac τ,A = {τ } for all A ∈ Ag is such an example. In order to see why, we refer the reader to the next section where we prove that such an action preserves all contents.
Another consequence of the restrictions in R is the following acquisition of knowledge after updates: Proposition 2. Let (S, ap, up, val ) be an appearance-update coalgebra. Then for all agents A ∈ Ag, all states s ∈ S, and all applicable actions a ∈ Ac with positive contents µ a for all a ∈ Ac a,A , we have
Proof. Let s ∈ S and a ∈ Ac be such that up(s)(a) = * , we need to show that for A ∈ Ag we have s |= a ∈Ac a,A µ a for all s ∈ ap(up(s)(a))(A). By rationality restriction on ap(up(s)(a))(A), we must show that up(t)(a ) |= a ∈Ac a,A µ a whenever t ∈ ap(s)(A) and a ∈ Ac a,A are such that up(t)(a ) = * . By the content restriction, positivity of µ a and the preservation result we obtain up(t)(a ) |= µ a , which implies up(t)(a ) |= a ∈Ac a,A µ a .
From this proposition it follows that for the applicable action a with a positive content µ a , agents A ∈ Ag whose appearance of action a is identity Ac a,A = {a} or a singleton of an action with the same content as a's, acquire knowledge of µ a after the action a, that is up(s)(a) |= A µ a .
The known preservation results in the literature are special cases of our general results. For instance, it has been shown in [4] that contents that do not contain the epistemic modality are preserved under any update.
Epistemic Actions
We now return to the issue of associating a set of actions Ac a,A to each pair consisting of an action a and agent A and a content µ to each action a ∈ Ac 5 . To address this issue, we need to distinguish between different types of actions a. The most commonly modelled epistemic actions are public and secret announcements of facts and knowledge by agents [5, 3, 14, 7] . Here we also consider actions that involve lying and suspicion. Thus, our approach differs from the standard treatment of knowledge (see e.g. [13] ), in that our knowledge is not necessarily truthful, and agents can obtain wrong knowledge as a result of certain epistemic actions (e.g. misinformation as a result of an unsafe communication channel).
Skip. This is the action in which nothing happens, and is denoted by τ . Its content µ τ is the tt proposition, and the action appears as it is to all the agents, that is Ac τ,A = {τ } for all A ∈ Ag. This particular choice of µ τ and Ac τ,A is sufficient to guarantee that, in any appearance-update coalgebra, the skip action does not affect the epistemic content of states; that is, no knowledge is lost or acquired as a result of this action. This is formalised in the next two results, where we write F : Set → Set for the functor defined by
Proposition 3. In any appearance-update coalgebra (S, ap, up, val ) where the set Ac of actions includes the τ action, up(s)(τ ) ∼ F s for any state s ∈ S, where ∼ F ⊆ S × S denotes the F -bisimilarity relation on the F -coalgebra (S, ap, val ).
Proof. The statement follows by coinduction, namely by showing that the relation R ⊆ S × S given by { (s, up(s)(τ )) | s ∈ S } is an F -bisimulation. The preservation of facts ensures that R only relates states with the same valuations, whereas the rationality restriction guarantees closure of R under appearances.
Since F -bisimilar states satisfy the same content formulas, a stronger preservation of knowledge result can now be formulated for the τ action. Corollary 1. Let (S, ap, up, val ) be an appearance-update coalgebra. Then for all contents µ and all states s ∈ S, we have
Public Announcements. The simplest non-trivial communication action is the public announcement µ! of a content µ. This action changes the appearances of states to the agents in a uniform way, namely by updating all the states in the appearance set of each agent A with Ac µ!,A = {µ!}. Thus, whenever µ! is applicable to a state s, the rationality restriction gives, for each A ∈ Ag
Using this, one can show a common knowledge property following a public announcement. We define the truthful common knowledge of a content µ among group β of agents as follows Proof. We need to show that for any state s and any state s connected to the applicable update up(s)(µ!) = * via any sequence of appearance maps we have s |= µ. That is, we have a sequence of states up(s)(µ!) = s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s m = s such that for 0 ≤ j ≤ m and some agent A j ∈ Ag we have s j+1 ∈ ap(s j )(A j ). For the empty sequence we have m = 0, in which case s 0 |= µ follows from the applicability of update up(s)(µ!) = * , the content restriction, and our preservation result. Other wise, for a non empty sequence we have that s m is in the following set of nested appearances
which is equal to the following by applying the rationality restriction m times
By the content restriction up(t m )(µ!) = * is equivalent to t m |= µ and from this by the preservation result it follows that up(t m )(µ!) |= µ.
Private Announcements. A private announcement µ! β is the action of announcing the content µ to a subgroup of agents β ⊆ Ag. It changes the appearances to agents in the subgroup uniformly and similarly to the public announcement (that is, Ac µ! β ,A = {µ! β } for all A ∈ β), but has no effect on the appearances to agents outside of the group (that is, Ac µ! β ,A = {τ } for A ∈ β). Thus, assuming µ! β is applicable to a state s, the rationality restriction gives
We leave to the reader to show that after the private announcement µ! β of a positive content µ, it is common knowledge among the insiders B ∈ β that µ.
On the other hand, the outsiders do not learn anything as a result of the private announcement.
Proposition 5. For β ⊆ Ag and any state s of an appearance-update coalgebra in which the private announcement µ! β with a positive µ is possible, we have
where, in the above, ∼ ⊆ P κ S × P κ S denotes the lifting of the the bisimilarity relation ∼ on S to a relation on P κ S 6 .
Private Announcement with Suspicious Outsiders. This is a private announcement µ! β,γ of a content µ to the subgroup β ⊆ Ag, where a group of outsiders γ ⊆ Ag suspect it, that is, they think either nothing has happened or a private announcement has taken place. We model the suspicion by making the appearance of suspicious agents include both the states in which no announcement has happened and the states in which the private announcement µ! β has happened. Thus, the set of actions Ac µ! β,γ ,A is taken to be {µ! β,γ } for agents A ∈ β, {µ! β , τ } for agents A ∈ γ, and {τ } for agents A ∈ β ∪ γ. Here, we assume that β ∩ γ = ∅. The extreme case is when all the outsiders suspect the private announcement, that is, when γ = Ag \ β.
Lying. So far we have implicitly assumed that the originator agent of an action is honest and that the announcement is truthful. As a result, the appearance of the originator (or the announcer) changes in the same way as the appearances of its audience (the announcees), for example the group β for a private announcement µ! β . Thus, there was no need to distinguish between the originator and the rest of the agents. But what if this is not the case and the announcer is a lier? So when he announces µ, the negation of µ is true. In this case, we have to distinguish between the originator and the rest of the agents. We use the notation µ † A for the action with content ¬µ in which an agent A lies that µ to the rest of the agents Ag \ {A}. The restriction for this action is obtained by taking the set Ac µ † A ,A to be {µ † A }, (since A is aware of the lying), and the set Ac µ † A ,B to be {µ!} for any B = A (since the lying appears as a public announcement to everyone else). Using this, one can show that after a lying action µ † A with a positive µ, the people who are being lied to obtain a common knowledge in µ, which is not necessarily truthful.
Proposition 6. For any agent A ∈ Ag, any set β = Ag \ {A}, and any state s of an appearance-update coalgebra in which the lying action µ † A with a positive µ is possible, we have
Proof. We need to show that for any state s and any state s connected to the applicable update up(s)(µ † A ) = * via any sequence of length more than 1 of appearance maps of agents in β, we have s |= µ. Consider a sequence of states up(s)(µ † A ) = s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s m = s with 1 ≤ m, such that for 0 ≤ j ≤ m and some agent B j ∈ Ag \ {A} we have s j+1 ∈ ap(s j )(B j ). It follows that s m is in the following set of nested appearances
which is equal to the following by applying the rationality restriction m times (once for the lying action µ † A and B 0 and m − 1 times for public announcement µ! and B 1 to B m−1 )
We also show that the lier A knows about this common knowledge Proposition 7. For any agent A ∈ Ag, any subset β = Ag \ {A} and any state s of an appearance-update coalgebra in which the lying action µ † A with a positive µ is possible, we have
Proof. We need to show t |= * β µ for all t ∈ ap(up(s)(µ † A ))(A). By rationality condition we have
Since up(w)(µ † A ) = * and µ is positive, by the above proposition 6 it follows that up(w)(µ † A ) |= * β µ.
We can easily define group lying µ † β where the group β lie to the rest, also private lying µ † β,γ where the group β (or a single person) lies privately to the group γ. We can also extend this to the case when the outsiders suspect the private announcement, and also to the more interesting case when the insiders suspect that they are being lied to.
Security Actions. Another implicit assumption made in the above actions is the safety of the communication channel. This means that whenever an announcement is made, it is assumed that the destined agents hear (or receive) it exactly as it was sent and the outsiders can only suspect the action. This is not always the case, especially in security applications and message passing actions where the outsiders can not only know all the actions that happen in the channel, but also intercept and change them. We will formalise the restriction for an unsafe private announcement µ µ {A},β,γ , where the intruders in γ change the original content µ sent by A to the agents in β to a fake one µ . In this case, the set Ac µ µ {A},β,γ ,A is taken to be {µ! β∪{A} } (as agent A thinks he is privately announcing µ to β), Ac µ µ {A},β,γ ,B is taken to be {µ ! β∪{A} } for agents B ∈ β (who experience a fake private announcement of µ ), Ac µ µ {A},β,γ ,C is taken to be {µ µ {A},β,γ } for the intruders C ∈ γ (who are the only agents fully aware of what is happening), while Ac µ µ {A},β,γ ,D = {τ } for any other agent D ∈ Ag \ ({A} ∪ β ∪ γ). Using these one can show the following proposition, the proof of which is left as an exercise for the reader Proposition 8. For any agent B ∈ β, C ∈ γ, and any state s of an appearanceupdate coalgebra in which the security action µ µ {A},β,γ with positive µ and µ is possible, we have
This can be extended to cater for other cases when the sender or the receivers or the rest suspect the interception. An extreme case for this type of action is when the intruder stops the message and thus the receivers do not receive anything at all, so the appearance of the insiders will be the same as that of the outsiders: they think nothing has happened.
As a general principle and to be able to define similar restrictions for communication actions, one has to distinguish between three groups of agents: the originator of the action, the agents intended to receive it, otherwise known as the insiders, and the rest of the agents, otherwise known as the outsiders. The originator can be honest or dishonest and the channel can be safe or unsafe. In a safe channel, the outsiders can suspect the private action, the insiders and the originator can suspect that they suspect it, and so on. In an unsafe channel, the outsiders can themselves be divided into two groups: intruders and nonintruders. The intruders are sure about the private communications, to which they are outsiders, and they can also change them. The originator, insiders, and non-intruders can suspect these interceptions, and so on. The choice of actions for each of these groups of agents is determined by the type of communication action, the type of agent and the condition of the channel.
When modelling the behaviour of dynamic epistemic systems coalgebraically, of particular interest among appearance-update coalgebras is the final one. Our use, in the definition of T , of the κ-bounded powerset functor to model appearances of states guarantees the existence of a final T -coalgebra -this is obtained via a standard limit construction, see e.g. [25] for details. Then, a final appearance-update coalgebra also exists, and can be constructed as the largest sub-coalgebra of the final T -coalgebra which, in addition, satisfies all the restrictions in R. The elements of the final appearance-update coalgebra correspond to abstract behaviours incorporating both epistemic information and the effect of updates on this information.
We conclude this section by introducing a notion of behavioural equivalence on epistemic actions. An immediate consequence of our earlier characterisation of T -bisimilarity is that epistemic actions are bisimilarity-preserving, that is, for any action a and applicable updates up(s)(a) and up (s )(a) with s ∈ S and s ∈ S , we have
But we can also use bisimilarity of states to define an epistemo-behavioural equivalence between actions:
Definition 2. Two epistemic actions a 1 , a 2 ∈ Ac are said to be epistemobehaviourally equivalent (written a 1 ∼ = a 2 ) if their updates yield bisimilar states, that is, if for any T -coalgebra (S, ap, up, val ) and any state s ∈ S, either up(s)(a 1 ) = up(s)(a 2 ) = * , or up(s)(a 1 ) = * and up(s)(a 2 ) = * and up(s)(a 1 ) ∼ up(s)(a 2 ) .
Thus, two actions that always yield bisimilar updates are regarded as equivalent. However, obtaining bisimilar updates is not that easy, since this is determined by the rationality restrictions for each action. Roughly speaking, two actions will have bisimilar updates if they are of the same kind and therefore their updates are restricted by the same rationality axiom.
Examples
The Muddy Children Puzzle. The original puzzle goes like this: n children are playing in the mud and k of them have dirty foreheads. Their father announces that at least one of them is muddy, and asks if they know it is them who is muddy. They look around and think and reply no. We prove that after k − 1 rounds of no answers, the dirty children know that they are dirty and will answer yes. After this yes answer, the clean ones get to know that they are not dirty.
As models of the puzzle we consider appearance-update T -coalgebras satisfying some additional restrictions (which encode the assumptions of the puzzle). The set of atomic propositions used in the definition of T is taken to be At = {D i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, where D i is the proposition saying child i is dirty. The set of agents is taken to be {1, . . . , n}, while the set of actions is taken to be Ac = {q 0 , q, q , q }, where
! denotes the yes answer of the dirty children and no answer of the clean children, and finally q := n j=k+1 ¬ j D j ∧ ¬ j ¬D j ! denotes the no answer of the clean children. The assumption that each child can see all the other children's foreheads is encoded using the following additional restriction on T -coalgebras:
where, in the above, i and j range from 1 to n. Only appearance-update coalgebras satisfying the above restriction are considered as models for the muddy children puzzle. There exists a maximal such coalgebra, obtained as the largest sub-coalgebra of the final appearance-update T -coalgebra, all of whose states satisfy the restrictions. We now fix a coalgebra satisfying the restriction, and prove some results about its states.
For the dirty children we have Proposition 9. In a state s k with k dirty children, if the father's first announcement followed by k − 1 rounds of no answers go through, then after this sequence of announcements the dirty children know that they are dirty, and hence the k'th round of no answers does not go through, whereas the yes answer of the dirty children goes through
where up k (s)(q) ∈ 1 + S stands for k times updating state s with action q
Note that, in this proposition, because we are proving a conditional, we do not need a common knowledge assumption for the children. However, we are able to prove a stronger, non-conditional version of the above result with a common knowledge assumption as follows Proposition 10. In a state with k dirty children, if it is common knowledge among the children that each child is uncertain about whether he is dirty or not, then k − 1 rounds of no answers from all the children followed by the yes answer of the dirty children and no answer of the clean children go through after the father's initial announcement.
For the clean children we then have
Proposition 11. In a state s k with k dirty children, if it is common knowledge among the children that each child is uncertain about whether he is dirty or not, then after the father's first announcement followed by k −1 rounds of no answers from all the children and one round of yes answers from the dirty children and no answers from the clean children, the clean children know that they are clean, and hence their no answers will not go through
where Ap(s) ∈ P(S) gives the states reachable from s through appearance maps, that is, Ap(s) contains all states s with the property that there exist states s 0 = s, s 1 , . . . , s k = s such that for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, s j+1 ∈ ap(s j )(i) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We prove the first two propositions and then use them to prove the third one.
Proof (of Proposition 9)
. By the content restriction, the father's initial announcement can not go through in a state with no dirty child, and each round of no answers can not go through in a state where a child knows that he is dirty. Consider the real state s k and assume that the father's announcement and k − 1 rounds of no answers go through, that is, up k−1 (up(s k )(q 0 ))(q) ∈ ι 2 (S). We show that, after this series of announcements, all dirty children know that they are dirty. Thus, assuming that the dirty children are the first k ones, we have to show the following for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
By the rationality restriction (applied k times), it suffices to show D i ∈ val(t) for all t in the following set: step 2.
We denote this set by K and show that all of its elements satisfy D i , by doing a case analysis on w. If in w child i is dirty, that is, D i ∈ val(w), then by preservation of facts we get D i ∈ val(up k−1 (up(w)(q 0 ))(q)). But if in w child i is not dirty, then w has one less dirty child than s k and we denote it by w k−1 .
We show that this state does not contribute to the definition of K by showing the following up k−1 (up(w k−1 )(q 0 ))(q) = * We distinguish two cases: (1) up k−2 (up(w k−1 )(q 0 ))(q) = * , in which case we are done, and (2) up k−2 (up(w k−1 )(q 0 ))(q) ∈ ι 2 (S). In the second case, we know that k − 2 rounds of no answers are possible after the father's initial announcement in w k−1 , and have to show that for all other dirty children j = i, they get to know after the k − 2 rounds, that is
In order to prove this, we repeat steps 1 and 2 above but on a state with one less dirty child, and assuming one less update is possible; these steps get repeated (k −2 times) until we reach a point where we need to show up 1 (up(w 1 )(q 0 ))(q) = * . For this, we repeat steps 1 and 2 one last time and have to show that up(w 0 )(q 0 ) = * , which is true by the content restriction since the father's announcement can not go through in a state with no dirty child. This is where the repetition stops and we are done.
This proof demonstrates the dynamic nature of the muddy children puzzle by recursion rather than induction: we start the repetition in exactly the same place as the induction is started in the relational and algebraic proofs [13, 2, 3] , the recursion corresponds to the inductive step, and our halting condition is the base case of the induction. In order to see the recursion, note that we have shown that k consecutive rounds of no answers can not go through on up(s k )(q 0 ) by showing that k −1 consecutive rounds of no answers can not go through on up(w k−1 )(q 0 ), which, in turn, is proved by showing that k − 2 consecutive rounds can not go through on up(w k−2 )(q 0 ) and so on, by showing that k − (k − 1) consecutive rounds can not go through on up(w k−(k−1) )(q), which is true since the father's announcement can not go through on w 0 . In other words, using recursion we have shown that for k dirty children and after k − 1 rounds of no answers the dirty children know that they are dirty, if for k − 1 dirty children and after k − 2 rounds of no answers the dirty children know that they are dirty. The halting condition of this recursion is the father's initial announcement.
Proof (of Proposition 10).
We begin by introducing some terminology. We define an appearance path between two states s and t as a sequence of states s = s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s m+1 = t with the property that, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m, s i+1 ∈ ap(s i )(j) for some child j s.t. val(s i ) D j . Using the assumption of the puzzle, we can infer that the number of dirty children either decreases or stays the same while moving from s 0 to s m+1 using appearances. If state s has k dirty children and state t has l dirty children, we write s k t l whenever such an appearance path exists. In addition, we call a state s a state of uncertainty if all children are uncertain in s, that is, for each child i there exist s 1 , s 2 ∈ ap(s)(i) with val(s 1 ) D i and val(s 2 ) D i .
If the number of dirty children is k ≥ 2, then from the content restriction we infer that the father's announcement goes through in the initial state, while from the common knowledge assumption on the initial state together with the rationality restriction we infer that the resulting state s k is a state of uncertainty, and for any appearance path of form s k t l with l ≥ 2, t l is also a state of uncertainty. We show that k − 1 rounds of no answers go through in state s k , by showing that in a state of uncertainty s k with k ≥ 2 dirty children, if all appearance paths s k t l with k ≥ l ≥ (m+1) end in a state of uncertainty (t l ), then at least k − m rounds of no answers go through in s k . We abbreviate the above property by P (m). From the restrictions on the coalgebra, it follows that P (k − 1) holds -since s k is a state of uncertainty, at least one no answer is possible in s k . We now show that, in order to prove P (m − 1) for some k > m ≥ 2, it suffices to prove P (m). To this end, we assume that s k is a state of uncertainty and all appearance paths s k t l with k ≥ l ≥ m end in a state of uncertainty. From this, we infer that any state
is also a state of uncertainty. Since s k is a state of uncertainty, by the content restriction a no answer from all the children goes through in s k . Moreover, by rationality and the previous observation on the states s , the resulting state t k is a state of uncertainty, and all appearance paths t k u l with k ≥ l ≥ m+1 end in a state of uncertainty. Thus, proving P (m−1) can be reduced to proving P (m), whenever k > m. By iterating the above step, we can reduce proving P (1) to proving P (k − 1). But P (k − 1) has already been shown to hold. It thus follows that P (1) holds, which, together with our initial observation that s k is a state of uncertainty and all appearance paths of form s k t l with l ≥ 2 end in a state of uncertainty, gives us that k − 1 rounds of no answers from the children go through in s k . The fact that a yes answer from the dirty children goes through after the k − 1 rounds of no answers from the children now follows from Proposition 9.
Proof (of Proposition 11).
For the clean children we proceed similarly to the dirty children, and show that if the father's announcement followed by k − 1 rounds of no answers from all the children followed by a yes answer from the dirty children and no answer from the clean children go through, that is, up(up k−1 (up(s k )(q 0 ))(q))(q ) ∈ ι 2 (S), then after this series of announcements the clean children know that they are clean. Thus, for all clean children i > k, we have to show
The proof is done in the same way as for the dirty children, that is, by rationality and case analysis on ap(s k )(i), but this time for the clean children. In the case when w ∈ ap(s k )(i) with D i ∈ val(w), we consider states with one more dirty child w k+1 and we have to show
This is true by Proposition 10 above, since in state w k+1 the common knowledge assumption still holds (as w k+1 ∈ ap(s k )(i)), and therefore the k'th round of no answers can go through, that is up(up k−1 (up(w k+1 )(q 0 ))(q))(q) ∈ ι 2 (S). Now using the content assumption, it follows that the yes answer of the dirty children and no answer of the clean children does not go through in up k−1 (up(w k+1 )(q 0 ))(q).
Cheating Muddy Children. The puzzle goes as before, but just before the k − 1'th round, all but one of the dirty children (say, all except the first one), cheat by secretly telling each other that they are dirty. We denote this private communication action as
In the k − 1'th round, all these dirty cheating children will announce that they know they are dirty, whereas the first one and the clean children answer as usual.
We denote this mixed round of answers by a public announcement
We prove that in the k'th round the only non-cheating child will wrongly conclude that he is clean. This is expressed in the following proposition Proposition 12. In a state s k with k dirty children, if it is common knowledge among the children that each child is uncertain about whether he is dirty or not, then 1. after father's initial announcement and k − 2 rounds of no answers from the children, a cheating action between dirty children 2 to n is possible, and can be followed by the yes answer of children 2, . . . , k and the no answer of children 1, k + 1, . . . , n, and 2. after this series of announcements, the dirty child 1 will wrongly conclude that he is clean.
Proof (of Proposition 12).
The fact that the cheating action π is possible in the state up k−2 (up(s k )(q 0 ))(q) follows from the preservation of facts and from the content restriction for private announcements, after noting that
Since π does not have any visible effect on the appearances to children 1, k + 1, . . . , n (and hence the no answer of these children will still go through in up(up k−2 (up(s k )(q 0 ))(q))(π) ), and since π changes the appearances of children 2, . . . , k (in such a way that they will now answer yes), it follows by the content restriction for public announcements that ρ is possible in the resulting state.
We prove the second statement by showing that none of the states in the appearance to child 1 of the resulting updated state satisfies
The rationality restrictions for the public announcement ρ, the private announcement π and the public announcements q and q 0 give us the following equivalent form for the appearance of the updated state to child 1
So it is enough to show that for all w as above, the following holds
By preservation of facts, this is equivalent to showing that
We fix w ∈ ap(s k ) (1) with up(up k−2 (up(w)(q 0 ))(q))(ρ) = * , and assume D 1 ∈ val(w). Then we have k dirty children in w, and since w is in ap(s k )(1) and the common knowledge assumption holds in s k , it still holds in w. So we can apply Proposition 10 and conclude that k − 1 rounds of no answers go through in w, that is up k−1 (up(w)(q 0 ))(q) = * This is in contradiction with the condition on w, that is
since, by the content restrictions for q and ρ, these two actions can not both go through in the same state -the former assumes that none of the children 1, . . . , n know whether they are dirty, whereas the latter requires that the children 2, . . . , k know that they are dirty.
Comparison with Baltag's Coalgebraic Model
We now compare our coalgebraic semantics with that of [1] . In loc. cit., both epistemic states and epistemic actions are defined via final coalgebras. Two different functors of a similar shape are used to achieve this. However, none of these functors accounts for epistemic updates, which are instead modelled using a partial product between coalgebras of states and coalgebras of actions. The functor used in [1] to model epistemic states is
Appearances of states to agents are encoded as elements of P κ (S) Ag , while their valuations are encoded using sets of atomic propositions. Epistemic states are then defined as elements of the final F -coalgebra Ψ . Similarly, epistemic actions are defined as elements of the final coalgebra of the functor
with P κ (Σ) Ag encoding the appearances of actions to agents, and P(Ψ ) encoding the content of actions (as sets of epistemic states where the actions are applicable). Finally, epistemic updates are modelled using a functor
which takes a pair consisting of an F -coalgebra (S, ap S , val S ) and a G-coalgebra (Σ, ap Σ , cont Σ ) to another F -coalgebra whose elements correspond to updates of states in S with actions in Σ. Writing ! S : S → Ψ for the unique F -coalgebra morphism arising from the finality of Ψ , the coalgebra for the updated states has carrier
That is, updated states are pairs consisting of a state s ∈ S and an action σ ∈ Σ, with the additional property that the content of the action σ makes it applicable to the state s 7 . The coalgebra map ap S⊗Σ , val S⊗Σ :
That is, the appearances of updated states to agents are computed using both the appearances of the original states and the appearances of the actions producing the updates. In contrast to the above, our approach uses only one functor, which incorporates both the epistemic and the dynamic aspect of states. This internal modelling of updates is made possible by the fact that we apriorily fix a universe Ac of actions, together with its epistemic structure. The set Ac should be thought of as containing those epistemic actions (elements of the final G-coalgebra) which are of interest to the modelling of a particular multi-agent scenario. In this setting, our choice to specify, for each action a ∈ Ac and agent A ∈ Ag, a set Ac a,A of actions that are perceived by A as potentially happening when in fact a is happening, together with, for each action a, a content µ a , gives rise to a coalgebra (Ac, ap Ac , µ Ac ) of the following functor
In the above, the set C consists of equivalence classes of content formulas, where two content formulas are said to be (semantically) equivalent if and only if they are satisfied by the same states of any F -coalgebra. The map ap Ac of the abovementioned H-coalgebra is given by ap Ac (a)(A) = Ac a,A for a ∈ Ac and A ∈ Ag, whereas the map µ Ac takes actions a ∈ Ac to the equivalence class of their content [µ a ]. In this way, we do not distinguish between actions that have both the same epistemic structure and semantically equivalent contents.
In order to make precise the relationship between appearance-update Tcoalgebras on the one hand and the models of [1] on the other, we make the dependency of T on the set Ac of actions explicit, and write T Ac : Set → Set for the functor given by
Next, we let AppU pCoalg denote the category whose objects are pairs (Ac, S), with Ac = (Ac, ap Ac , µ Ac ) an H-coalgebra and S = (S, ap S , up S , val S ) an appearance-update T Ac -coalgebra. The H-coalgebra Ac encodes the structure on the set Ac of actions required to formulate the content and rationality restrictions of Section 2, whereas the T Ac -coalgebra S specifies a set of states carrying both an epistemic structure and a dynamic structure w.r.t. the actions in Ac. To define the arrows of the category AppU pCoalg, we first note that any H-coalgebra morphism f : Ac → Ac induces a functor
that takes a T Ac -coalgebra (S, ap S , up S , val S ) to the T Ac -coalgebra with the same carrier set and appearance and valuation maps, but with an update map w.r.t. the set Ac instead. This update is derived from the curried version ev(up S ) : S× Ac → (1 + S) of the update map up S of the T Ac -coalgebra, as shown below
The curried version of this composition is the update map of the T Ac -coalgebra
So we have
Now the arrows from (Ac, S) to (Ac , S ) in the category AppU pCoalg are pairs of maps (f, g) with f : Ac → Ac an H-coalgebra morphism and g : S → U f S a T Ac -coalgebra morphism. The former encodes the actions in Ac as actions in Ac , whereas the latter translates the states of the T Ac -coalgebra S to states of the T Ac -coalgebra S . The last piece of notation we require before relating our models to those of [1] concerns so-called characteristic formulas. These are formulas of the kind used in Section 2 to specify the content of an epistemic action. However, this time they are interpreted over F -coalgebras rather than over T -coalgebras (in a similar way). Furthermore, characteristic formulas have the additional property that they can characterise individual states of F -coalgebras up to F -bisimulation. Concretely, since the functor F is κ-accessible, it follows from general results on coalgebraic logics (see e.g. [10, Section 4] ) that for any state ψ of the final F -coalgebra Ψ , there exists a characteristic formula µ ψ with the property that, given any state s of an F -coalgebra S, we have s |= µ ψ if and only if ! S (s) = ψ.
We are now ready to describe the relationship between the models of [1] and our appearance-update coalgebras. This is given by an adjunction
where -µ Σ (σ) = ψ∈cont Σ (σ) µ ψ , where for ψ ∈ Ψ , µ ψ is the characteristic formula of ψ. -S = (S , ap S , up S , val S ) is a T Σ -coalgebra obtained by 1. first letting S = (S , ap S , val S ) = ∪ i∈ω (S i , ap Si , val Si ) where
(Note that, by definition, each of the sets S i comes equipped with an F -coalgebra structure, and S inherits this structure.) 2. subsequently endowing the set S with an update map up S :
In informal terms, the functor L constructs an H-coalgebra Σ and a T Σ -coalgebra S from a pair consisting of an F -coalgebra S and a G-coalgebra Σ. The Hstructure of Σ is determined by the G-structure of Σ in a trivial way: appearances of actions to agents are already defined by the H-structure, whereas the content map µ Σ : Σ → C acts on an action σ ∈ Σ by logically joining all the characteristic formulas of states in the content of σ. The T Σ -coalgebra S is obtained by performing consecutive update products with the actions in Σ, first on S, and then on the result of the preceding update product:
and subsequently taking the union of the resulting F -coalgebras and endowing it with an update map.
Proposition 13. The T Σ -coalgebra S is an appearance-update coalgebra.
Proof. We have to show that S satisfies all the restrictions in R. The preservation of facts follows directly from the definitions of S i and S : for i ∈ ω, whenever up S (s i )(σ) ∈ ι 2 (S ), that is, whenever (s i , σ) ∈ S i+1 , we have
For the rationality restriction, assuming up S (s i )(σ) ∈ ι 2 (S ), that is, (s i , σ) ∈ S i+1 , we have
for each i ∈ ω, and therefore
Finally, for the content restriction, we have,
and hence
where the map cont Ac : Ac → P(Ψ ) takes an action a ∈ Ac to the set of states in the final F -coalgebra which satisfy the formula µ Ac (a).
Informally speaking, the functor R takes a pair consisting of an H-coalgebra Ac and an appearance-update T Ac -coalgebra S, and produces an F -coalgebra and a G-coalgebra. The F -coalgebra is obtained from S by forgetting its update map and keeping everything else intact. The G-coalgebra has the same carrier set and epistemic structure as Ac, and a content map obtained essentially by replacing content formulas with their denotations in the final F -coalgebra.
Theorem 1. L is left adjoint to R.
Proof. We begin by examining the unit and counit of this adjunction. Since the categories Coalg(H) and Coalg(G) are naturally isomorphic, it is the move from T Ac -coalgebras to F -coalgebras and back that makes the adjunction non-trivial. For the unit of the adjunction, the inclusions η S,Σ : S → S ∪ (S ⊗ Σ) ∪ ((S ⊗ Σ) ⊗ Σ) ∪ . . . together with the natural isomorphism between Coalg(H) and Coalg(G) give rise to a natural transformation η :
For the counit, the maps Ac,S : S ∪ (S ⊗ Ac) ∪ ((S ⊗ Ac) ⊗ Ac) ∪ . . . → S defined inductively by Ac,S (s) = s Ac,S (s i , a)) = up S ( Ac,S (s))(a) for i ∈ ω and s i ∈ S i together with the natural isomorphism between Coalg(H) and Coalg(G), yield a natural transformation :
We show that η and indeed constitute the unit and counit of an adjunction L R. To this end, we fix (S, Σ) ∈ Coalg(F ) × Coalg(G) and (Ac, S ) ∈ AppU pCoalg. For (f, g) : (S, Σ) → R(Ac, S ), the map f
is a T Ac -coalgebra morphism that satisfies
Furthermore, any T Ac -coalgebra morphism with the above property is defined in this way. In diagram terms we have
Furthermore, this last requirement uniquely determines the definition of k . In diagram terms we have
Coalgebraic Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Coalgebras give rise to modal logics in different ways, for example the coalgebraic logic of Moss [19] , the temporal logic of Jacobs [15] and the modular logic of Cîrstea and Pattinson [8, 9] . In previous work [24] , we showed how one obtains an algebraic logic from our functor by predicate lifting, and investigated the connection between this logic and the algebraic dynamic epistemic logic of [3, 23] . In this section, we show how our appearance-update coalgebraic models admit a modular coalgebraic logic. Cîrstea and Pattinson have shown how complete, multi-modal coalgebraic logics are derived in a modular fashion for an inductively-defined class of endofunctors on Set. Applying this method to our setting, we obtain a logic with a multi-sorted syntax, as well as a proof system for this logic. The resulting modal language is generated by the following grammar:
with P ∈ P(At), a ∈ Ac and A ∈ Ag. Formulas of type L are the ones of interest, whereas the remaining types of formulas serve merely as a tool for defining L and its coalgebraic semantics. This semantics is defined inductively on the structure of formulas, and involves a satisfaction relation |= γ ⊆ C × L between states of a coalgebra (C, γ) and formulas in L. This is defined via a number of intermediary satisfaction relations, one for each formula type:
(see [9] for details). The particular shape of the functor T means that the syntax of the logic can be simplified to the following BNF, with no loss in expressiveness
The proof system is similar to a normal propositional modal logic and includes the following axioms and rules
Apart from these axioms and rules obtained directly from the modular method, we have axioms for the restrictions that we imposed on our coalgebra. The preservation of facts is captured by the axiom
The axiom for the general form of the rationality restriction is
In both cases, there is one such axiom for each epistemic action a and each (type of) agent A. Also each action has a content, which is a formula of the fragment of our logic without the dynamic modality 9 . These are as specified for in section 2. The axiom corresponding to the content restriction takes the following form for an action a ∈ Ac with content µ
We refer to this logic as an appearance-update logic. Proposition 14. The axiom of partial functionality in [5] is derivable from the axioms and rules of our appearance-update logic, that is 
The right hand direction easily follows from (the right hand direction) of the following (referred to as the deterministic axiom in [15] 
This follows by propositional reasoning from
and
The entailment (1) follows from
The entailment (2) follows from
Example of Derivation. Consider a simple Man in the Middle Attack: agent A sends a message with a factual content p to agent B, on the way the intruder C changes p to another fact p and thus B receives p instead. If we assume that A does not suspect the interception, after sending p he believes that B believes in p. Similarly, upon receipt, B believes that A believes in p . In security terms and since A and B do not suspect the interception, they will wrongly authenticate with each other. We use the encoding of the security action in section 2 and provide a logical proof of the following
The proof steps are sketched below The proof steps are sketched below:
Theorem 2. Soundness Every derivable formula of appearance update logic holds in any appearanceupdate coalgebra, that is, for φ ∈ L and (C, γ) we have
Proof. The soundness of the usual modal propositional axioms and rules follows from the modular construction of semantics [9] . So it is enough to show that the axioms for preservation of facts, rationality, and content hold in any appearanceupdate coalgebra. That is, for (C, γ) an appearance update coalgebra and a ∈ Ac an action with content µ we have to show
By the modular construction of semantics this is equivalent to
For the preservation of facts axiom assume c |= γ [a]p for an arbitrary state c ∈ C, by the modular construction of semantics this is equivalent to 'if up(c)(a) = * then p ∈ val(up(c)(a))'. By the preservation of facts restriction on (C, γ), this is equivalent to 'if up(c)(a) = * then p ∈ val(c)', which is, by modular construction, equivalent to c |= ¬[a]ff → p. For the rationality axiom assume c |= [a] A φ for an arbitrary state c ∈ C, by modular semantics this is equivalent to 'if up(c)(a) = * then ∀c ∈ ap(up(c)(a))(A), c |= φ'. By the rationality restriction on (C, γ), this is equivalent to 'if up(c)(a) = * then for all a ∈ Ac a,A and c ∈ ap(c)(A) if up(c )(a ) = * then we have up(c )(a ) |= φ'. By modular semantics this is equivalent to c |= γ ¬ [a] ff → a ∈Ac a,A A [a ] φ. For the content axiom assume c |= µ for an arbitrary state c ∈ C, by the content restriction on (C, γ) this is equivalent to up(c)(a) = * , which is, by modular construction, equivalent to ¬[a]ff.
The proof of completeness is based on a translation of our logic to the ordinary epistemic logic (i.e. with only labeled boxes). This translation is presented in [5] and is based on the following rewrite system R for an action a with content µ
Since the appearance-update logic and the logic L(α) of [5] have the same syntax, axioms, and rules the following two results of [5] also hold in our logic.
Lemma 1. The above rewrite system is terminating and the normal form of each formula, to which we refer as the translation of that formula to epistemic logic, is a box only labeled modal formula.
Lemma 2. Every formula of the appearance-update logic is derivable if and only if its normal form is derivable, that is for φ ∈ L and its normal form φ t ∈ L we have φ ↔ φ t Lemma 3. Every formula of the appearance-update logic is semantically equivalent to its normal form, that is for φ, φ t ∈ L and any appearance-update coalgebra (C, γ) we have |= γ φ iff |= γ φ t Proof. We show that the rewrite rules of R and their reverses, that is, both directions of the rules hold in any appearance-update coalgebra (C, γ) 10 . This property for the first and last rules is equivalent to the soundness of the axioms 10 In other words, they preserve validity of formulas.
of preservation of facts and rationality. Similarly, for the other two rules we have to show Lemma 4. The final appearance coalgebra can be extended to an appearanceupdate coalgebra.
Proof. Let (F, γ) denote the final T -coalgebra, where T (X) = P κ (X) Ag × P(At). Given a fixed set of actions Ac, a content µ a for each a ∈ Ac, and a set of actions Ac a,A ⊆ Ac for each a ∈ Ac and A ∈ Ag, let F = {(s, a) ∈ F × A | s |= µ a }. We define an update map The map up is defined by endowing F with a T -coalgebra structure ap , val : F → T (F )as follows:
ap (s, a)(A) = {(t, a ) | t ∈ ap(s)(A), a ∈ Ac a,A , t |= µ a } val (s, a) = val(s)
It then follows easily from the definition of up that the T -coalgebra (F, ap, up, val ) is an appearance-update coalgebra.
Theorem 3. Completeness
If a formula holds in all appearance-update coalgebras, then it is derivable in the appearance-update logic, that is for φ ∈ L and (C, γ) we have
Proof. Assume φ holds in all appearance-update coalgebras, then by lemma 3 so does φ t . By lemma 4 this includes the extended coalgebra of the final appearance coalgebra. Since φ t is an epistemic formula, it holds in the final appearance colgebra, which by [9] is complete with regard to the modular appearance logic. So φ t is derivable in the modular appearance logic. Since axioms and rules of the appearance-update logic include the axioms and rules of the appearance logic, φ t is derivable in an appearance-update logic and by lemma 2 so is φ.
Conclusive Discussions
An alternative way to model epistemic update is to consider coalgebras of a pair of set endofunctors T 1 , T 2 as follows T 1 (S, Ac) = P(S) Ag × P(S × Ac) × P(At)
T 2 (S, Ac) = P(Ac) Ag × P(S)
A T 1 , T 2 -coalgebra (W, γ) will have a pair of coalgebra maps as follows
The elements of S are the epistemic states and the elements of Ac are the epistemic actions. The projections of γ 1 encode appearance of states to agents, update of states by actions, and the valuation of a state. The projection of γ 2 encodes appearances of actions to agents and their content. The former is our previous Ac a,A set and the latter specifies the content as the set of states that satisfy it. Similar restrictions can be imposed on this coalgebra. The good point about this approach is that we model the epistemic structure of actions and their contents directly in the coalgebra. The weak point of this approach is its abstract actions: they are not fixed any more and there is a mutual dependency between them and the states. This causes problems, for example for the notion of bisimilarity of actions. Two actions are bisimilar if they have bisimilar appearances and contents. This is weaker than one would expect, that is as opposed to logical equivalence of contents. Also , in order for a final coalgebra to exist, one needs to impose a limit on the powersets. This will in particular cause a problem for having an action that can apply to all the states, for example the τ action. Making these issues more precise and studying bisimilarity, final coalgebra, and the modular coalgebraic logic of this functor constitute future work.
